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Abstract.  The macroeconomic role of microfinance appears to have varied 
enormously between country cases, as notably exposed by the recent wave of 
macro-economic crises. For example, in Indonesia in the late 1990s microfinance 
appears to have played a notably counter-cyclical role, whereas in Bolivia, the main 
focus of this paper, its role was in most cases to intensify rather than restrain the 
crisis. We find part of the explanation for this in the behaviour of government 
towards microfinance (much more conciliatory towards defaulting debtors in the 
Bolivian case) and in the structure of demand (unfavourable, in Bolivia, to the 
distribution and service sector which is the main market for microenterprise). 
However, closer examination of the Bolivian case suggests that institutional design 
also played an important role. In particular, those organisations which provided 
savings, training and quasi-insurance services bucked the trend of rising default rates 
and falling lending through the crisis and did particularly well, whereas the new 
breed of consumer-credit microfinance organisations did particularly badly and in 
several cases went out of business. This experience suggests,in particular, that 
it may be appropriate to call into question the fashionable’ minimalist’ (credit-only) 
model of microfinance, as certainly in Bolivia it was principally the credit-plus 
institutions which proved more financially disciplined and more resilient to crisis. 
 
 
 
1. Points of departure 
 
In many countries of the South, including Indonesia, Bolivia, Bangladesh and 
Kenya, microfinance has achieved a significant role within the macroeconomy, but 
this role has never been investigated on a comparative basis. Particularly in times of 
macro-economic crisis, it is important to know whether microfinance is likely to act 
as a shock-absorber , tending to restrain the magnitude of fluctuations, or as an 
accelerator, tending to amplify them. In relation to the recent global crisis, Patten 
and Rosengard (2001), have argued that in the midst of a severe macro-economic 
collapse in Indonesia between 1998 and 2000, lending and savings deposits within 
the Indonesian microfinancial system and in particular the BRI (Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia) unit desa system experienced continuous increase, as a consequence of 
which investment by small businesses was able to increase as well: microfinance was 
acting as a shock-absorber. But these tendencies are not seen everywhere: for 
example, in Bolivia, which is the focus for this study, several institutions which 
provided much of the motive force for the Bolivian economy during the boom of 
the 1990s (Rhyne, 2001) declined even more severely than the national economy, 
and microfinance, prima facie, has exercised scarcely any countercyclical influence 
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in the aggregate. The function of this paper is to understand, not only why the 
macroeconomic influence of microfinance seems to have differed between these 
two cases, but also what policy instruments and institutional design features might be 
able to enhance the ‘positive’ role of microfinance during a crisis. In this way we 
hope to contribute to an emerging broader debate (see Hardy et al, 2002) on how 
the role of microfinance institutions in the national economy can be optimised. 
 
 
 
 
    2. Management of the Bolivian crisis: 1998-2004 
 
It is useful to remember that in Bolivia microfinance derived its initial impulse from 
a much more serious crisis than the one which currently afflicts the country. It was 
the hyperinflation of 1985, and the consequent loss of confidence in the formal 
financial sector, which created an opportunity for microfinance NGOs to offer, over 
the following ten years, a financial product which had previously been inaccessible 
for small Bolivian enterprises (Fischer et al 1992; Glosser 1993; Hulme and Mosley 
1996, ch 9). The other factors favouring a spectacular growth of microfinance in this 
period derived from the consequences of a structural adjustment process of 
proportions almost rivalling those of eastern Europe, which pushed many 
thousands of people out of mining and other state employment into self-
employment, in which function they found themselves strongly supported by several 
donors (especially USAID and IDB) and by a centre-right government which saw 
microfinance as a particularly appropriate technique (Newman et al. 1991) for 
‘mitigating the social cost of adjustment’. 
 
Under the stress of these changes, the Bolivian macroeconomy experienced a 
pronounced structural change away from the primary (agriculture and mining), and 
in favour of the tertiary sector1 – the principal market for most microfinance 
institutions. This was favourable for the nascent microfinance sector: at the end of 
2002, it accounted for less than 6% of all savings deposits, only 9% of the portfolio, 
but 57% of bank customers (Microfinanzas, December 2002, Annex 1) and the 
small business sector, now principally served by microfinance institutions, supplied 
an estimated 80% of all employment. 
 
Under the impetus of a creative regulatory environment which allowed a number of 
microfinance NGOs to convert themselves into banks or ‘private financial funds’2, 
the Bolivian microfinance sector had by the middle of the 1990s achieved not only 
rapid rates of growth but also serious profits, with BancoSol for several years 
achieving the highest rates of profit of any financial institution in the country3. These 
profits, in the classical manner, attracted new entrants into the industry, in particular 
consumer-credit houses (FFPs de consumo). Several of the new entrants, such as 
                                                 
1 Rhyne(2001), table 2.1, states that between 1985 and 1989 the share of manufacturing within the 
informal sector declined from 31% to 17%, whilst the share of trade and services grew from 35% to 
56%. 
2 Fondos financieros privados(FFPs): nonbank financial institutions authorised, unlike NGOs, to take 
deposits from the public. 
3 The entire microfinance sector earned a return on assets of 4.8% in 1997, which had fallen to –0.5 per 
cent by December 2002. 
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the FFPs ACCESO, CrediAgil and FASSIL, put nearly all their eggs into the urban 
microcredit basket, but with important changes of procedure. They  offered larger 
loans than established microfinance organisations and commercial banks, generally 
for the purchase of consumer durables such as televisions and washing-machines 
rather than business assets;  and their techniques of loan appraisal were much more 
casual, involving no proper assessment of capacity to repay.  Under the pressure of 
this competition several of the established credit providers, including BancoSol and 
PRODEM, increased their loan size also4, and in the process  none of the players in 
the game noticed either the deterioration of portfolio quality that was taking place 
or the increase in customers’ overall debt-service ratios, as bigger and less well-
supervised loans were thrust at an already over-exposed market. The entry of these 
new players was so rapid5 , indeed, as to unbalance the entire microfinance sector 
and to create a serious problem of over-indebtedness even before the global crisis 
hit Bolivia in 1999 (Marconi 2002). The main focus of all this overlending was the 
urban sector, where economies of scale could more easily be achieved and the 
perceived costs of lending kept down. There were some occasional successful 
experiments in rural credit, such as the FFP PRODEM and the NGO CRECER, 
but the growth of these organisations was heavily limited by their dependence on 
donor financing(FINRURAL 1998). 
                         Thus the Bolivian microfinance sector, for all its diversity and 
creativity, entered the global financial crisis (which hit Latin America only in 1999) 
with four important disadvantages: (1) over-indebtedness caused by the entry of the 
consumer-credit FFPs ;  (2)anxiety and uncertainty about clients’ repayment 
capacity6 in the light of this over-indebtedness; (3) a strong urban bias to loan 
operations; and (4) a persistent weakness, especially in rural areas, in the 
mobilisation of savings. All of these circumstances contrast with the situation in 
much of Asia and, in particular, with the situation of Indonesia as described by 
Patten et al. 
 
                   Within this context we may now examine the crisis which hit Bolivia 
(together with other Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina)  at the 
beginning of 1999, long after it struck East Asia and Russia.  As may be seen in 
table 1,  the onset of this crisis was immediately signalled by a collapse of domestic 
investment, eventually reflected in a withdrawal of foreign capital. In Bolivia, there 
were by 2002 serious contagion effects from the crisis in neighbouring Argentina, as 
Bolivians found themselves barred from repatriating their savings.  At the level of 
microfinance institutions, also, there was a fall in the amount of credit lent, but this 
fall was spread very unevenly across the different actors within the sector.  
                                                 
4 ‘ Before the middle of 1999 (BancoSol) introduced a whole heap of new financial products, generally 
aimed at a higher market stratum than that occupied by solidarity groups. It placed itself in competition 
with conventional lenders by increasing its maximum loan size from $30,000 to $100, 000. It 
introduced mortgages, giros en descubierto, and consumption loans. [It also introduced a minimum 
limit on savings deposits, thereby discriminating against low-income consumers – Authors] An 
employee protested: “The end of the world occurred when BancoSol offered a $50,000 loan to the 
Roda family”  ‘( a well-known rich Bolivian family). Rhyne 2001: 153-154. 
5 For example: the clients of ACCESO grew between 1995 and 1998 from zero to 90, 000 – a larger 
number of clients than BancoSol had achieved in twelve years. 
6 At this time there existed a risk-assessment service operated by the Superintendency of Banks, but 
accessible only to the ‘regulated’ sector (FFPs and banks) 
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Table 1. Bolivia: main indicators for macroeconomy and microfinance, 1997-
2003 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Real economy        
GNPper capita (in 
current US $) 
 1070 1023 1016 949 883 870 
Real GDP growth (%)  5.2 0.4 2.4 0.0 2.5 2.6 
Investment/GNP(%)  23.8 18.4 17.3 17.0 15.0 12.5 
Savings/GNP(%)  16.0 12.5 11.8 12.7 13.4  
Urban unemployment 
rate(%) 
 5.3 6.1 6.8 7.3 7.4 8.0(2) 
Estimate of headcount 
poverty(%) 
65.6(1)    58.6   
External sector        
Exports FOB (in  US $ 
mn)  
 1104 1051 1230 1296 1381 1650 
Imports CIF (in US 
$mn) 
 1759 1539 1610 1529 1519 1684 
BoP Current 
account/GNP(%) 
 -7.8 -5.9 -5.5 -4.3 -3.6 0.2 
Foreign 
investment/GNP(%) 
 11.9 12.9 10.7 8.7 8.3 4.5(3) 
Monetary sector        
Inflation (end of 
period, %) 
 4.4 3.1 3.4 2.5 3.0 3.9 
Exchange rate (end of 
period) Bs/$ 
 5.7 6.0 6.4 6.8 7.2 7.6(4) 
Average real 
exchange 
rate(1997=100) 
 96.6 95.3 98.0 99.1 103.3  
Microfinance 
sector 
       
Total value of portfolio 
(US$ millions) 
236.3 299.4 276.0 246.5 291.0 315.4 326.2 
Banco Sol and 
microfinance FFPs  
(US $ millions) 
93.4 
 
140.9 
 
 
161.8 
 
181.8 
 
205.7 
 
230.5 245.8 
Consumer-credit FFPs  
(US $ millions) 
88.3 
 
109.0 
 
 
47.9 
 
24.4 
 
19.6 6.9  
NGOs (US $ millions) 37.6 
 
 
49.5 
 
 
61.3 
 
64.5 
 
 
65.7 
 
 
78.0 80.4 
Estimate of 
investment by 
microenterprise sector 
(US $ millions) (5) 
72.4 166.2 48.1 14.7 41.9   
 
Source: Banco Santa Cruz/Muller y Asociados, Estadisticas socio-economicas 2001;  
FINRURAL, Microfinanzas (latest issue June 2003); most recent data from Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica (www.ine.gov.bo) 
 
Notes (1): Figure is for 1995 and derives from INE, Encuesta integrada de hogares 1995, 
La Paz 1997. 
(2) ‘Government  estimate’, from La Prensa, 23.12.03. 
(3) Estimate for first six months of year, grossed up to year as  a whole. 
(4) 2003 average. 
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(5): The estimated value of investment by the microenterprise sector is the value of 
lending by each institution in each year, weighted by a coefficient which measures the 
average relationship between loan value of investment for the following institutions: 
BancoSol, PRODEM, Pro Mujer yand SARTAWI. For details of the method of estimation 
see Mosley(2002), table  6. 
 
          In face of the crisis each actor had to determine her or his own coping strategy.  
          We now examine the strategies adopted by three key actors: the state, the  
         suppliers of microfinance and the small businesses who constituted their market. 
 
The state 
               Towards the end of the boom, in the elections of 1998, the centre-right 
government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was replaced by the former dictator 
Hugo Banzer. Banzer’s economic policy mixed together opportunistic liberalising 
gestures aimed at the IMF7with much more interventionist actions aimed at a 
working-class electorate impoverished by the sudden slump. In relation to the 
microfinance sector, the new government’s policy was counterproductive in the 
following senses: (i) whilst microfinance continued to be trumpeted as a distinctive 
Bolivian solution to poverty, various measures were taken to damage its potential 
(for example the Ley de Aduanas (Customs Duty Reform Act) of 2000, which 
radically reduced customs duties on a whole range of consumer goods – in 
particular goods of low-income consumption such as second-hand clothes – and 
thereby destroyed the market and the loan repayment capacity of many small-scale 
manufacturers of such goods; (ii) several legislative actions, notably the Ley de 
Propiedad y Credito Popular and Ley de Condonacion de Deudas (Debt 
Forgiveness Act), also of 2000, alleviated the burden of debt for various bankrupt 
parastatal agencies and in the process undermined the repayment ethic for all – 
including microfinance - borrowers; (iii) a determination to dilute methods of 
regulation which might have a political cost – most clearly seen in the case of the 
Superintendencia de Bancos itself, which having most valuably created the category 
of ‘registered nonbank financial intermediaries’ (entidades financieras fiscalizadas) 
in the mid-1990s, was then forced to condone the illegal operating practices of the 
consumer-credit FFPs, to introduce new rules which limited debt-service payments 
to 25% of salary (Rhyne 2001:147); (iv) having pushed various microcredit 
wholesalers (such as FONDESIF) into the rural areas, the state bought back much 
of the high-risk portfolio of these organisations, thereby creating a moral hazard 
problem which reacted adversely on these organisations’ arrears position. Through 
these contradictory policies the Banzer government first inflated and then pricked 
the credit bubble of 1998-9, in a manner which led to a general collapse of 
confidence in the market for microfinance services. When the Sanchez de Lozada 
regime returned in early 2002 it was powerless to achieve any calm de-escalation of 
the expectations which the Banzer government had fomented; there was severe 
rioting in protest at the government’s economic policy in February and October 
2003, and de Lozada himself was forced to resign and flee the country in late 
October. Whether these events8 should be seen as a cyclical blip or as a return to 
Bolivia’s traditions of chronic state instability is too early to say; but they have 
certainly made harder the recovery of investment and of the macro-economy. 
 
                                                 
7 For example, throughout the crisis no increases were allowed in the level of real public spending or in 
the fiscal deficit (see Table 1). 
8 See further footnote 18 below. 
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Financial institutions 
Microfinance institutions’ strategies and performance in face of the crisis were very 
diverse, as pictured in Table 2 and Figure 1: 
(1) Commercial banks shrank their lending earliest (in late 1998) and have  
      continued to shrink through the crisis, with  total lending in 2003 less than  
      three-quarters of what it was in 1998. 
(2) BancoSol and the registered nonbank financial intermediaries  (FFPs) 
maintained a gently growing volume of deposits and lending, with arrears, 
however, rising from a low base to an average of just over 10% . Within this 
group, there are two notable ‘positive outliers’, with higher rates of portfolio 
growth and lower rates of arrears – FIE and Caja Los Andes.  
(3)The consumer-credit FFPs which emerged to take advantage of the boom proved 
completely unable to withstand the recession: all were unable to retain any  
loyalty with their hard-pressed clients;  as a consequence, they experienced rapidly-
rising default rates and could no longer sustain their portfolios (Table 2).  ACCESO 
and CrediAgil, born in 1997, have already expired, and FASSIL continues to 
experience very severe problems of viability. 
(4)Among the NGOs, again, we observe divergent performance. A majority, as with 
the FFPs, were forced to labour against decreasing demand and increasing default 
rates; but two institutions, both practising a village-banking model and lending  
principally or exclusively to low-income women (CRECER and ProMujer) grew 
against the general trend, whilst continuing to experience default rates of less than  1 
per cent.  
 
Table 2:  Bolivia: indicators of microfinancial performance, 1997-2003 
(portfolio in $ millions; default rates expressed as percentages) 
 
 1997(Dec) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
        
Commercial banks 3185 4023 3786 3174 2769  2827 
Cooperatives and 
mutual societies 
426 469 457 465 442  459 
Microfinance 
houses: 
BancoSol*: 
Portfolio value $mn 
Portfolio in arrears 
(%) 
 
 
 
63 
 
1.9 
 
 
 
74 
 
4.5 
 
 
 
82 
 
7.0 
 
 
 
77 
 
12.3 
 
 
 
81 
 
14.7 
 
 
 
81 
 
9.4 
 
 
 
84 
 
7.6 
Microfinance FFPs:        
PRODEM 
Portfolio value $mn 
Portfolio in arrears  
(%) 
 
18 
 
1.7 
 
24 
 
16.7 
 
21 
 
15.2 
 
23 
 
3.1 
 
33 
 
7.9 
 
44 
 
5.3 
 
46 
 
5.2 
FIE** 
Portfolio value $mn 
Portfolio in 
arrears(%) 
 
12 
2.7 
 
14 
1.5 
 
19 
6.2 
 
22 
7.9 
 
27 
8.0 
 
35 
6.5 
 
36 
4.9 
Caja Los Andes** 
Portfolio value $mn 
Portfolio in 
arrears(%) 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
5.8 
 
35 
6.5 
 
46 
7.6 
 
52 
8.1 
 
64 
5.8 
 
69 
4.1 
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BancoSol and all 
microfinance FFPs, 
total 
Total portfolio 
value $mn 
Portfolio in arrears 
% 
 
 
 
93.4 
 
2.0 
 
 
 
140.9 
 
4.6 
 
 
 
 
161.8 
 
6.7 
 
 
 
181.8 
 
9.3 
 
 
 
205.7 
 
11.0 
 
 
 
230.5 
 
7.3 
 
 
 
245.8 
Consumer-credit 
FFPs: 
       
Acceso 
Portfolio value $mn 
Arrears rate % 
 
80 
20.0 
 
88 
19.9 
 
32 
31.9 
 
5 
29.4 
 
1 
7 
 
Insig. 
0 
 
No 
data 
 
 
Fassil 
Portfolio value $mn 
Arrears rate % 
 
 
 
13 
8.6 
 
 
 
19 
14.1 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
13 
15.7 
 
 
 
8 
22.6 
 
 
 
6 
40 
 
 
 
No 
data 
Consumer-credit 
FFPs, total 
 
 
Portfolio value $mn 
Arrears rate % 
 
 
 
 
88.3 
19.4 
 
 
 
 
109.0 
19.4 
 
 
 
 
 
47.9 
29.6 
 
 
 
 
24.4 
20.9 
 
 
 
 
19.6 
29.5 
 
 
 
 
6.9 
39.8 
 
 
NGOs: 
       
ProMujer 
Portfolio value $mn 
Arrears rate(%) 
 
2.3 
0.4 
 
2.1 
0.4 
 
2.2 
0.6 
 
3.4 
0.3 
 
3.8 
0.6 
 
4.5 
0.2 
 
4.6 
0.3 
CRECER 
Portfolio value $mn 
Arrears rate(%) (%) 
 
1.3 
 
2.0 
2.3 
 
2.8 
0.4 
 
3.5 
0.3 
 
4.5 
0.3 
 
5.8 
0.5 
 
6.6 
0.4 
SARTAWI 
 Portfolio value $mn 
Arrears rate(%) (%) 
 
 
2.5 
3.9 
 
 
3.1 
5.4 
 
 
3.3 
6.0 
 
 
5.0 
8.3 
 
 
4.7 
23.0 
 
 
5.1 
17.2 
 
 
4.3 
17.2 
ANED 
Portfolio value 
Arrears rate(%) 
 
5.8 
4.7 
 
6.4 
5.1 
 
7.2 
7.3 
 
7.4 
10.5 
 
8.3 
15.7 
 
10.5 
19.0 
 
10.8 
28.0 
Other NGOs 
Portfolio value 
 
34.3 
 
47.5 
 
42.7 
 
50.8 
 
34.0 
  
All NGOs 
Portfolio value $mn 
Arrears rate(%) 
 
37.6 
4.5 
 
49.5 
6.8 
 
61.3 
7.1 
 
64.5 
10.5 
 
65.7 
12.1 
 
78.0 
13.2 
 
80.4 
Total microfinance 
sector: 
 
Portfolio value ($mn) 
 
Value of savings 
($mn) 
 
Arrears rate(%) 
 
 
 
 
236.3 
 
 
 
292.0 
 
 
 
 
10.1 
 
 
 
257.1 
 
188.3 
 
 
8.0 
 
 
 
246.5 
 
240.3 
 
 
11.5 
 
 
 
291.0 
 
223.8 
 
 
13.0 
 
 
 
315.4 
 
 
 
 
10.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
367.8 
        
Source: FINRURAL, Microfinanzas: Boletin financiero, 06/03 (available at www. finrural-bo.org) 
Notes: ** only offers individual loans, *offers some individual loans. 
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Figure 1. ‘The sheep’ and ‘the goats’: portfolio, arrears rates and 
estimated investment rates, 1997-2003 (Source as for Table 2) 
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                Thus, once we penetrate below the surface of the Bolivian ‘collapse’ – 
both macro and micro - we perceive a number of divergent trends. A majority of 
institutions did indeed behave in a procyclical way, especially during 1999 and 
2000, but four did not, and exhibited the same countercyclical tendencies that can 
be observed with BRI and other microfinance institutions in Indonesia; and these 
four were not confined to a particular institutional type, but rather can be found 
among both the ‘highly commercialised’ FFPs and among the apparently unworldly 
NGOs. Hence, it looks as though simple one-factor explanations are likely to be 
found wanting; but let us penetrate further, in the hope of trying to find lessons 
which microfinance providers and their sponsors can use. 
  The key feature which we observe in Bolivian microfinance with the 
onset of the crisis is a shift in the balance of market power: as one employee of 
FASSIL  put it, ‘Before [the mid 90s], the institution chose the client. Now, the 
client chooses the institution’ (Rhyne 2001: 153-154). Once the crisis took hold, a 
situation arose in which many clients had multiple debts outstanding to several 
different institutions, not all of which could be repaid; and the very helplessness of 
their predicament gave them power to ‘choose the institution’, and determine which 
creditor should be repaid first.  Why were ProMujer, CRECER, Caja los Andes 
and FIE the chosen institutions? 
  Let us begin with the NGO cases ProMujer and CRECER. These 
institutions differ from other NGOs in Bolivia in the following manner (table 3): 
• In the first place, in both institutions the clients are purely female; a 
characteristic associated almost worldwide9 with higher repayment rates, 
whether because women are more risk-averse, or have fewer possibilities of 
obtaining credit outside microfinance, or take more seriously the 
consequences for their children of their failing to repay, or a combination of 
the above. 
• Secondly, average loan size is smaller; hence the possibilities for exercising 
political leverage on the creditor  - (or, in the manner described above, on 
the Superintendency of Banks) in order to induce forgiveness of the loan 
are smaller. 
• Thirdly, both institutions use a ‘village banking’ methodology in which 
emergency loans are offered in case of need (on a vote of clients within a 
solidarity group) from an ‘internal account’ financed by a surcharge on the 
interest rates paid by all members. In Bolivia, as in other developing 
countries, it is very hard for low-income people to gain access to insurance10, 
which inhibits their room for manoeuvre in the event of a sudden adverse 
shock such as market collapse, children’s ill-health or burglary. The ‘internal 
account’ provides a modest form of insurance, and thereby of managing 
debt, not available to clients of other Bolivian NGOs. 
• Finally and perhaps most importantly, the village banks provide credit as a 
‘means and not an end in itself’ (Marconi 2002:4), within a package 
comprising technical training, health services, advice on legal rights and 
political education. In other words they practice an ‘integrated’ rather than a 
‘minimalist’  model: a model which, however much out of fashion with the 
microfinance establishment (Otero and Rhyne 1995, Robinson 1996; and 
                                                 
9 Indonesia, interestingly, appears to be an exception; Hulme and Mosley(1996),  vol. 2, chapter 11. 
10 The 2000 World Development Report (World Bank 2000: 143) states that ‘insurance markets are 
virtually non-existent in developing countries’. 
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even, in the current context, Rhyne 2001) compels intense loyalty from the 
women who benefit from it, by offering a range of services going far beyond 
a substitute for collateral. This loyalty leaves no room for doubt, in the event 
of crisis, as to who will be the first creditor to be repaid. 
 
Table 3. Bolivian microfinance organisations; Performance indicators 
and possible explanatory factors 
 
Indicator ProMujer and CRECER Other microfinance 
organisations 
Well-being indicators 
(as of December 2002) 
  
Poor and destitute(%) 38.3% 10.6% 
Without lowest level of 
education(%) 
14.1% 5.1% 
Asset value $ 421.6 924.4 
Average annual sales $ 757.9 2502.8 
Performance indicators 
(annual average 1997-2002) 
  
Growth of portfolio 24.7% 5.7% 
Growth of customer base 26.2% -5.3% 
Default rate 0.6% 9.8% 
Return on assets 6.9% -1.9% 
Design characteristics   
%female clients 98% 57% 
‘Internal account’ for emergency 
loans 
Yes No 
Loan modality Village banks with solidarity groups Solidarity groups, with the exception 
of FIE, Caja Los Andes, most of 
BancoSol, and the consumer-credit 
FFPs 
Average loan size($) 134 901 
Training services offered? Yes No (except for FIE) 
 
Source: performance indicators and design characteristics from FINRURAL, Microfinanzas, 
June 2003 edition; well-being indicators from preliminary results of impact evaluation studies of 
microfinance organisations conducted by FINRURAL for Ford Foundation. 
 
If these hypotheses explain the success of PROMUJER and CRECER, what can be 
said about the case of FIE and Caja Los Andes, which are FFPs lending to individuals 
at a far higher average level of income? In the first place, both institutions maintain very 
successful systems (initially developed by the German consultancy IPC) for the 
appraisal and monitoring of clients, which have enabled them to cream off the best 
clients, keep track of their overall indebtedness, and collaboratively work out fallback 
strategies in conjunction with clients as the crisis began to bite. In the second place, FIE, 
like PROMUJER and CRECER, has always used an ‘integrated lending model’ in 
which training is blended with credit, although in recent years the training function has 
been hived off into a separate department (Rhyne 2001: 88-91). 
 
 The interesting aspect of the success of PROMUJER, CRECER and FIE is that 
it contradicts the ‘lemons model’ of Akerlof (1972; see also Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) 
which states that in a market with asymmetric information caused by uncertainties about 
product quality – which the Bolivian microfinance market certainly is – bad products 
will, by analogy with Gresham’s law, drive out good and the nice guys will finish last. In 
Bolivia it is the bad guys (the consumer-credit FFPs), who sought to live purely by the 
rules of the market, who have been, over the course of the recession, virtually driven 
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out of it and (at least some of) the nice guys, who have sought to provide services and 
have been driven by principles going far beyond the requirements of loan recovery and 
profitability, who have succeeded in it. Of course, a part of this unusual result is due to 
the consequences of regulation by the Superintendencia de Bancos  - a parameter not 
contained in the models of Stiglitz and Akerlof; but this is not the whole story. Another 
part of it consists in the approach of the ‘nice guys’ to their clients, which took it as 
axiomatic that clients’ motivation was not purely economic, and based elements of the 
microfinance package – training, legal services, health and education services – on this 
supposition. These elements have turned out to be important components of clients’ 
coping strategies during the recession, hence the fact that they have induced loyalty in 
repayment towards institutions which provided those services. During the crisis, this 
approach turned out more successful, as a means of achieving loan recovery and growth 
in the portfolio, than the more materialistic strategies used by the consumer-credit FFPs 
and even by BancoSol (table 2 above). 
 
Clients 
 We consider the behaviour of clients at two levels: as individuals and in terms of 
the groupings of clients which emerged from 1998 onward. In both contexts the 
recessionary atmosphere, the consequent emergence of ‘ social movements’11  as 
alternative actors to conventional political parties and trade unions and the frequent 
calling of electoral commissions at local and national level were crucial in moulding 
client behaviour. 
 In this context, a variety of debtors’ cartels sprang up, responding to a varied 
range of motives. The first debtors’ protest was organised in El Alto, responding to local 
political motivations12 and extending eventually into other regions. The importance of 
this movement is that it achieved recognition both from the state and from the various 
bankers’ associations13 through the establishment, on 15 October 1999, of a first 
‘Framework Agreement’ between the new  ‘Small Borrowers’ Association’ and 
                                                 
11 For example, in Cochabamba the ‘Coordinadora del Agua’  emerged as a movement disputing the 
privatisation of water and the consequent price increases; and in the Chaco appeared, again, a 
Movimiento Sin Tierra proposing a redistribution of land rights in favour of smallholders and the 
landless.  
12 ‘A handful of ‘professional’ union organisers began gathering members into debtors’associations to 
protest against the consumer and microfinance lenders. These associations grew quickly, because 
organisers promised members debt forgiveness. The leaders claimed to speak for several thousand 
borrowers. The associations staged protests, mainly at the offices of ACCESO, CrediAgil, and other 
consumer lenders, but even at Caja los Andes and BancoSol. A few association members engaged in 
hunger strikes, a tactic with a long history in Bolivia (it contributed to ending military rule in the 
1980s). Through such tactics the associations attempted to take the moral high ground by painting the 
leaders as exploiters of the poor. In petitions to various authorities they accused the leaders of using 
humiliating tactics against debtors – hiring mariachi bands to perform outside a debtor’s house all 
night, painting the word debtor on the house, or broadcasting the names of debtors over the radio. They 
blamed the lenders for provoking every kind of social ill from suicide to prostitution. They demanded 
full debt forgiveness. 
The affected institutions, working through their newly created association ASOFIN, sought 
aid from the courts to stop the demonstrations… Eventually, the debtor associations forced their way 
into a dialogue with the Superintendency of Banks and ASOFIN, in which the microfinance lenders 
agreed to consider debt relief to association members on a case-by-case basis’. Rhyne 2001: 146. 
During the more severe disturbances of 2003, the Aymara and Quechua- dominated opposition parties, 
the MAS and MIP, began to support debt moratoria in the altiplano (La Prensa, 23 December 2003) 
13 ASOBAN represented the banks; ASOFIN represented BancoSol, the FFPs and the NGO 
AGROCAPITAL; FINRURAL the other financial NGOs; ASOCOP the savings and credit 
cooperatives; and UNIVIV the building societies (mutuals for house purchase) 
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ASOFIN, FINRURAL and CrediAgil, with the government’s Superintendency of 
Banks acting as a mediator. This association collapsed under its own weight when the 
leaders of the movement were denounced by their own members, with one of the 
leaders being jailed for a short time on suspicion of fraud. In the later wave of political 
protests in 2001 there emerged a ‘National-level Debtors’  Movement’ (Organisacion 
de Deudores en General a Nivel Nacional) with a more explicitly economic motivation 
under the leadership of a female lawyer who was able to convince thousands of 
borrowers to demand ‘forgiveness of all microfinance debts’. This cartel occupied the 
offices of the Superintendency of Banks, terrorist-style14, on the 2nd of July 2001, and a 
second agreement was signed15 two days later between it and the bankers’ associations, 
providing this time for the rescheduling of microfinance debts on a massive scale, and 
actual cancellations in the case of banks and FFPs. At the end of 2002 new debtors’ 
groups emerged, often associated with specific individuals who had evolved from 
microfinance clients into quite large-scale debtors with consequent political leverage16. It 
has to be emphasised, however, that the third and bloodiest wave of political protest 
during the current recession, on 12 / 13 February and 16/17 October 2003, was not 
directly associated with any of these debtors’ movements17. We would argue that the 
debtors’ movements represented the political and economic interests of a minority of 
microfinance debtors; notwithstanding this, the widespread reschedulings and the 
government’s offers of  a ‘hospital for sick enterprises’ to be provided by state 
development banks contaminated the repayment ethic of all clients and offered to all 
clients the option of seeking a way out of their difficulties by political action rather than 
by increasing productivity and seeking to widen their market.  This erosion of loan 
discipline reduced the ability of the microfinance sector to respond in a countercyclical 
manner and probably prolonged the recession. 
 With the coming of the crisis, therefore, clients became exposed to greatly 
increased levels of risk, caused partly by the recession itself and partly by ever-
increasing, and in some cases self-justifying, anxieties about the ability of microfinance 
institutions to manage their own portfolios effectively. In face of these increased risk 
levels, microfinance institutions had to work out their own survival strategies. In relation 
to the Bolivian case we may present the range of possible survival strategies in figure 2, 
in which the client seeks to maintain a balance between the rate of return on its 
portfolio (r  in the diagram  ) and a measure of the riskiness of that portfolio, such as 
the variance of yields (σ). Thus the client chooses the path which she wishes to follow 
between the upper boundary (XX’) and the lower boundary(YY’) of the capital market. 
The more risk-averse the client, the more she gravitates to the left-hand bank of the 
                                                 
 
15 The signatories were the new debtors’ association and the bankers’ associations ASOBAN, ASOFIN 
and FINRURAL; mediation was provided by the Superintendency of Banks. 
16 On 27 January 2003, under the initiative of the now ex- Minister for Financial Services, more 
rescheduling negotiations took place between representatives of financial services organisations and 
three different debtors’ associations.  
17 Note, however, the possible provocative influence of the debt moratoria organised by the Movimiento 
Sin Tierra (see page xx above).The trigger in February 2003 appears to have been, in the first instance, 
a proposed increase in income and corporation tax, which initially gave rise to non-violent street 
protests, but in the second place and crucially, to the decision by many police officers to side with the 
protesters. The government, alarmed by this, sent in the army, and of the estimated 30 who died in the 
subsequent bloodshed, it is estimated that 14 were in the police and 7 in the army.  In October, the 
trigger to the riots was a government plan to export oil and natural gas at a time of persisting domestic 
fuel shortage. On both occasions there was a wave of looting which did take in the premises of 
microfinance banks, notably BancoSol, but there is no evidence that any of this violence was planned 
or carried out by debtors’ associations. 
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river, and the more she seeks to avoid the dangerous right-hand bank, where the jaguars 
and the anacondas are to be found. Our assumption is that the need to avoid risk is 
most urgent for the poorest clients (in zone A), for whom its consequences are the 
gravest because they have least physical, human and social assets to fall back on; and 
that this group, therefore, are the most likely to adopt ‘protectional’ coping strategies 
(intra-group solidarity for their businesses and protection of consumption standards), by 
contrast with the better-off groups in zones B and C, who have greater risk efficacy 
(assets and strategies available to protect them against risk), and can thus embrace with 
much less anxiety ‘promotional’ strategies involving the purchase of fixed capital assets 
and the forming of networks outside the community. 
 
Figure 2. Risk , yield and the client’s  ‘expected growth trajectory’ 
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C : high risk (unless insurance available), high average yield, financial services demanded for fixed capital equipment (esp. 
housing and vehicles) and labour hiring as well as fixed capital. Social capital ‘linking’,  ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ to upper 
levels of administration.. 
Possible outcomes for individual borrowers: 
1:  the ‘super-ladder’: risk and return reduced at the same time. 
2: the normal ladder: borrower balances yield and risk through a sequence of loans, with stable or increasing levels of 
labour and capital input. 
             3: ‘the snake’: coping mechanisms unable to cope with increased levels of risk; borrower falls into default, and ultimately quits 
the capital market. 
 
 What happens, of course, may diverge from what is expected, as in the case of 
the crisis under discussion. This shrank the market available to  each client (the thick 
arrow on Figure 2); in other words it reduced the return on capital a client could expect 
and/or increased the risks associated with a given return, and thereby pushed them 
towards the dangerous right bank of the river. The client’s economic behaviour in face 
of such a shock, her long-term investment behaviour and even the contribution she is 
able to make towards any counter-cyclical contribution of microfinance depends on the 
degree of success of the risk management strategies adopted. Many possible options 
exist (see World Bank 2000 ch.8 for the general case, and Mosley 2001 and Sebstad 
and Cohen 2001 for Bolivian illustrations) but we suggest the following hypotheses for 
later examination: 
(i) The better the access a client has to anti-risk protection mechanisms 
(savings, insurance, or the PROMUJER/CRECER ‘internal account’), 
the easier it is to continue with strategies which protect or even increase 
the level of assets, rather than strategies which require the erosion or 
disposal of physical, human or social capital. 
(ii) The harder a group of clients is hit by an external shock, the more 
important is the level of internal solidarity within the group (bonding 
social capital)  for protecting both the morale of clients and their ability 
to work out creative escape routes from the crisis. There is some 
evidence that the training methods of CRECER, PROMUJER and FIE 
are effective in achieving such protection (Sebstad and Cohen, 2001). 
(iii) But if the forces of intragroup solidarity are weak, they are threatened in 
time of crisis by pressures which split the group, turn its members away 
from the path of increasing their productivity and their market, and turn 
them down the alternative path of trying to find a political rather than an 
economic solution to crisis, such as for example debt cancellation (for 
further illustration, consider Case Study 1 below). One method of 
avoiding these divisive intragroup pressures is heavily-supervised 
individual lending, as practised within our sample by FIE  and Caja los 
Andes, and indeed also by Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 
 
These differences not only help to explain differences between clients but also between 
institutions. We can illustrate the available strategies, and the factors which influenced 
their success, with two case studies: 
1 BancoSol client, 1993-2002.  This client, from 1993 to 1999,was one of BancoSol’s 
superstars18.  The expansion and diversification of his leather-manufacturing business 
from a small domestic to a large export market (and from a single room to a large four-
storey house) is described in Mosley(2000). In 1999 he left the solidarity group and 
became an individual borrower. In 2000 his sales collapsed in dramatic manner (from 
$2500 to $850 per month) principally on account of the collapse of his market in 
Cochabamba. This was a period in which, as will be recalled, there were violent protests 
                                                 
18 He is portrayed as such in Mosley(2001) 
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in Cochabamba against the increase in the price of water and other public services; as a 
consequence there developed, in particular in that city, a climate of non-payment of all 
debt, which impinged on the microfinance sector including this client. The client’s 
response, portrayed as (3) on Figure 2, can be described as high-risk19: 
• He obtained additional loans worth $26,000 from Caja Los Andes; 
• He continued to accumulate assets but with a bias towards housing: between 
1999 and 2002 the value of enterprise assets increased from $(US)2700 to 
$4370, but the value of housing assets from $10016 to $20193; 
• Having been damaged by loan default, he became a defaulter himself; in 
June/July 2001 he joined the defaulting debtors’ movement to try and achieve 
large-scale debt rescheduling (see above) and he ceased payment of instalments 
to his original creditor, BancoSol, with effect from November 2001; 
• Now he is  in arrears with both BancoSol and Caja Los Andes at a level of 
$11800. 
 
He is now in an unenviable predicament (very close to the dangerous bank of the river 
in Figure 2), hoping that his market will improve before the banks foreclose on him for 
the arrears on his own debts; indeed, on the day that we called to interview him he was 
in Cochabamba pursuing his own defaulting clients. The interesting aspects of the case 
are the importance of political factors in determining the vigour of localised domestic 
markets, and also the influence of ‘psychological factors’ – in particular the client’s 
denial of the gravity of his own position, which drove him to adopt a high-risk coping 
strategy. 
 
2 ProMujer c ient, 1999-2002.  This client, a member of a solidarity group within a 
‘village banking’ organisation, manufactures knitwear and jackets for the local market. 
Her sales grew through the early years of the crisis, 1999 and 2000, but fell in 2001. In 
response: 
l
                                                
(i) she obtained an emergency loan from the ProMujer internal account; 
(ii) she took one of her children out of school and thus reduced, in the short 
term, the value of her human capital investment; 
(iii) she became involved in a new enterprise (essentially a take-away restaurant 
accepting contracts with small local firms), but operated this on a communal  
basis with colleagues within the ProMujer group, thereby sacrificing some 
individual gain, but strengthening bonds of solidarity. 
(iv) In addition she became engaged in informal political activities, campaigning 
with other colleagues for control over the imports of second-hand clothing 
whose liberalisation had damaged many small clothing businesses (see page 
5 above) 
 
 Here we see the interaction of an institutional design instrument (the ProMujer internal 
account) with a coping strategy which, depicted as (1) in Figure 2, is much more risk-
avoiding and collective in nature than the first case study.  Only social capital assets 
(investment in communal economic and political activities) were allowed to increase; 
human capital investment, as we saw, was cut, and physical investment did not alter. But 
economic security did increase, in the first instance as a consequence of the emergency 
loan from the village bank, and over the longer term because the loan was reinvested in 
 
19 Many thanks to Julio Cesar Herbas of BancoSol with help in updating this case-study. 
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a manner which deepened the bonds of individual trust between the client and her 
colleagues. 
 
The ‘market’ 
As illustrated in particular by Case Study 1 above, no enterprise can function without a 
market. Consequently, we must conclude our examination of the macro-role of 
microfinance with an examination of the contrasted behaviour of different sectors of the 
Bolivian economy. 
 
From table 4 it is clear that the 1998-2002 recession was strongly differentiated between 
economic sectors. Agriculture was the first to experience a negative shock, with the 
collapse of soya prices in 1998; retail and wholesale trade were the next to decline, in 
1999, in a manner strongly connected with the over-expansion of microfinance, and 
after a gentle recovery in 2000 there was a new and more generalised recession in 2001, 
which affected all sectors including wholesale and retail trade. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Rate of increase of demand (gross domestic product) for various sectors, 1997-
2001 
 
Sector Annual rate of increase in real GDP (at 1990 prices) (%) 
 1997    1998 1999 2000 2001
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
Agriculture 1.0 -4.5 2.5 3.7 1.1 0.6  
Manufacturing 1.0 2.4 2.9 1.7 1.1 1.8  
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade 
3.7 3.5 -0.2 2.7 0.3 1.8  
Services, 
restaurants 
and hotels 
5.8 5.1 3.8 2.1 1.9 3.0  
Total 4.8 4.4 1.5 2.0 1.1 2.5  
Source: Muller y Asociados, Estadisticas socio-economicas 2002, La Paz 2002, table p.31. Updated from 
www.ine.gov.bo. 
 
It can be readily seen that the sector most affected by the recession have been wholesale 
and retail trade (which did not help BancoSol or PRODEM, two of the microfinance 
institutions with their eggs most concentrated in this basket), and since 2001, 
agriculture. Until 2001 one of the sectors least affected by the recession was 
manufacturing, which was helpful to FIE, one of the few microfinance institutions to 
dedicate a large part of its portfolio (more than 30%) to small industrial enterprises. In 
the following section we shall use the weighted average rate of growth of demand for 
each sector to try and explain the performance of the various microfinance sectors, 
especially in terms of their investment rates and their macroeconomic leverage. 
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3. ‘Micro-macro linkages’: an initial portrait 
 
In this section we attempt to convert the preceding argument into a model which makes 
possible an analysis of the linkages between microfinance and the macroeconomy. Our 
particular wish is to understand the circumstances under which microfinance (or rather, 
particular components of the microfinance sector) sometimes serve as a brake, and 
sometimes as an accelerator, in face of a macroeconomic crisis. 
 
 
 
The six basic links in the chain are depicted in figure 3 below (an analytical version is 
given in the Appendix ). 
 
Figure 3. Macro-micro linkages: the basic model structure 
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1. Macroeconomic policy: in this sector of the model, government actions are applied 
by means of fiscal instruments (government spending, taxes and customs duties) and 
monetary policy; and also sometimes by means of direct intervention in the regulation 
and rescheduling of microfinance loans, as described above. In our simple model all of 
these interventions are left exogenous   (link 1 in the model); however, we treat the level 
of investment by small enterprises as variable according to the degree of government 
intervention in the microfinance sector. 
 
2. Consumption and imports: vary in the normal way with the level of income. 
 
3.Behaviour of microfinance institutions: We assume that the volume of loans which 
any institution makes within a defined period depends on: 
• The rate of growth of demand of the sector(s) towards which the production 
of that organisation’s clients is oriented – which acts as a constraint on the 
rate of growth of the market; 
• The effects of national economic policy, which as mentioned above affect 
not only the level of  demand, but also, as we have observed in Bolivia, 
impinge on default rates; 
• Default rates themselves, which constrain the financial sustainability of the 
microfinance organisation and its ability to make new loans; 
• External financing, concessional (i.e. aid) and non-concessional, which 
directly influences the assets of microfinance NGOs, and as we saw, fell 
radically through the years of crisis; 
• Finally, the attitude of the microfinance institution towards external 
financing, which includes and influences the institution’s view of its future 
prospects. 
 
4. Client behavour . We split total investment into that part carried out by 
microenterprises (the informal sector) and the part carried out by other public and 
private enterprises (the formal sector); and in this model we treat investment by the 
formal sector as exogenous (or, alternatively, determined in the conventional way by 
interest rates and the growth of demand). Investment by the informal sector, of course, 
also depends on the growth of demand for the products of that sector, and we recall 
from Patten  et al. (2001: 1065 ) that it was the resilience of demand for this sector in 
Indonesia which provided much of the basis for BRI Indonesia to increase its lending 
through the 1998-2000 recession. However, there are also influences on the supply 
side, which as we have seen have an important influence on the client’s  willingness to 
increase its assets in order to meet this demand, such as: 
• The range of financing options available; 
• The existence or non-existence of ‘quasi-insurance options’, such as savings 
facilities or the ‘internal accounts’ of the village banks, which can protect a client 
from going into arrears in the event of a failed investment; 
• Expectations about the future which do not involve an extrapolation of past 
trends. 
 
5. Inequality and poverty. Microfinance has the potential to reduce poverty – for many 
institutions this is the primary objective. According to our earlier analysis (Mosley 2001) 
this potential is being realised in the case of many Bolivian institutions, not only through 
direct effects on the borrower but also through indirect effects on labour markets and 
 19
on enterprises which are connected to client enterprises through backward and forward 
linkages. 
 
6. The composite effect of microfinance. Thus the impact of microfinance is a  double 
one: there is a direct, and fairly quick, impact through the national income multiplier, 
and there are indirect and often more gradual impacts operating through institution-
building, training, social capital impacts, etc. 
 
In this way it is possible to visualise, and in principle estimate, the links between 
microfinance and macroeconomy. However, the results which follow are subject to 
three limitations: first, some of the data, especially those related to investment by small 
business, are of imperfect quality, as we shall proceed to describe20; secondly, the very 
simple construction of the model may exclude linkages which are  important for the 
model’s conclusions (for example, we focus on the behaviour of micro finance and 
microenterprise, and we assume that investment by this sector bears no relation to 
investment by large enterprises, but this may be an error); finally, in our present state of 
knowledge concerning the ‘wider impacts’ of microfinance some of them have to be left 
out of the story (e.g. table 6 below). Given these omitted linkages, we hope that our 
estimates of the impact of microfinance can be seen as conservative. 
 
Some of the estimated relationships which follow are either completely conventional in 
nature (for example the consumption and import functions – linkage 2) or else are 
taken from research already carried out (e.g. poverty impacts – linkage 5). Here, 
therefore, we shall focus on the relationships which drive the model – those relating to 
the lending of microfinance institutions (link 3) and investment by microenterprises 
(link 4). In tables 5 and 6 we present the results of regression analysis on these two 
variables. The data analysed there (48 observations) are panel data taken from eight 
microfinance organisations for the years 1997-2002. 
 
According to table 5, lending by microfinance institutions increases with the level of 
demand (weighted according to the portfolio of the institutions in the sample), and falls, 
significantly, with the arrears rate, as might be expected. The political dummy is 
positive, suggesting a positive, but, short-term effect of rescheduling on investment. The 
‘insurance’ dummy variable does not appear with the expected sign; we would stress 
that we do not see the ‘internal account’ mechanisms of the village banks as a necessary 
condition for portfolio growth, but rather as one possible device, which, in conjunction 
with other design features, may protect portfolio quality. 
                                                 
20 See further the Appendix. 
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Table 5. Determinants of lending by microfinance institutions 
 
Dependent variable: change in total value of portfolio ($ millions) 
Ordinary least-squares analysis 
Regression coefficients on independent variables : R2
Constant ‘Political’ 
dummy3
Growth of 
demand1
‘Insurance 
dummy’ 
‘Individual 
lending 
dummy’4
Arrears rate2  
6.45  0.067 
(0.15) 
-5.76** 
(2.95) 
-7.17** 
(3.94) 
-0.36* 
(2.34) 
0.31 
5.70 4.26* 
(2.38) 
0.158* 
(1.88) 
-5.14** 
(2.78) 
7.39** 
(4.32) 
-0.41* 
(2.38) 
0.41 
Notes and sources: Number of observations =48 (annual data for 1997-2002 inclusive for BancoSol, 
FIE, ProMujer, PRODEM, SARTAWI, Caja Los Andes, ANED, CRECER). 
 Figures in brackets below coefficients are Student’s t-statistics. ** denotes significance at 1% level, * 
denotes significance at 5% level. 
1Demand is calculated as average (weighted by sector) annual growth of demand for the clients of each institution. 
For the weights (the distribution of each institution’s portfolio by sector) see Microfinanzas, (FINRURAL, La 
Paz), December 2002 edition, tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
2Arrears rates from Microfinanzas, (FINRURAL, La Paz), December 2002 edition, . 
3 ‘Political dummy’: 1 in years and for institutions where loan rescheduling was negotiated on behalf of some 
clients; 0 otherwise. 
4’Individual lending dummy’: 1 for years and institutions where some or all clients received individual rather than 
group loans; 0 otherwise. 
5’Insurance dummy’: 1 for years and institutions where clients had recourse to some kind of emergency-loan or 
insurance facility; 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
               Estimated investment by the microfinance sector (table 6) rises, as expected, 
with the rate of growth of demand (the accelerator relationship) , with the volume of 
credit extended and with the availability of ‘defences against risk’ (σ). The ‘insurance 
dummy’ variable does not have a significant relationship with the level of investment, 
but it does have a significant relationship with the rate of growth of investment, as 
portrayed in table 6. 
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Table 6. Estimated determinants of investment by the microenterprise sector 
(ordinary least squares estimation) 
 Dependent variable 
  
   Estimated investment by
microenterprise sector  (in $ 
millions: see note 3) 
 
Growth of investment by
microenterprise sector (%) 
Regression coefficients on 
independent variables: 
 
 
 
 
  
Constant 0.35 0.7 -43 
Volume of saving 0.014 
(1.37) 
0.021* 
(2.01) 
 
Growth of demand2 0.04* 
(2.16) 
0.036** 
(2.47) 
0.34* 
(2.07) 
‘Insurance dummy’5 -0.61 
(0.94) 
 5.83** 
(2.64) 
‘Defences against risk’ 
dummy4
 -0.57* 
(2.48) 
 
‘Individual lending’dummy -1.50 
(1.81) 
 -10.26 
(0.11) 
Value of lending($mn) 1.54* 
(2.25) 
 
2.22** 
(2.67) 
 
3.90** 
(2.56) 
Number of observations1 48 48 48 
R2 0.65 0.69 0.77 
Notes and sources: 1  Observations are drawn from the institutions BancoSol, PRODEM, ProMujer, FIE, SARTAWI, Caja Los 
Andes, ANED and CRECER over the years 1997-2002 inclusive. 
2Demand is calculated as average (weighted by sector)annual growth of demand for the clients of each institution. For the 
weights (the distribution of each institution’s portfolio by sector) see Microfinanzas, (FINRURAL, La Paz), December 2002 
edition, tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
3The estimated value of investment for the microenterprise sector is the value of lending by each institution in each year, 
weighted by a coefficient which measures the average relationship between the value of lending and investment in 1998-99 for 
BancoSol, PRODEM, ProMujer and Sartawi, which is then applied to all institutions in the sample (Appendix Table 9 below).  
4’Defences against risk’ dummy varies with the extent of voluntary savings and quasi-insurance within the institution in question; 
for method of computation see Appendix Table 10. 
Volume of saving and value of lending are from FINRURAL, Microfinanzas: Boletin financiero, 12/02 (available at www. 
finrural-bo.org) 
5’Insurance dummy’: 1 for years and institutions where clients had recourse to some kind of emergency-loan or insurance 
facility; 0 otherwise. 
 
We now have estimates, albeit not always very good ones, for all the links in the model 
of Figure 3. Using these estimates, we calculate the value of investment in the Bolivian 
microfinance sector at an average of $68 million21 between 1997 and 2002; that is, 6.5 
per cent of gross national investment. This implies an average annual contribution to 
gross national product by the microfinance sector over those years of $122 million, or 4 
per cent of GNP. The share of the microfinance sector is greater in boom years such as 
1998 (given that on average, as we have seen, Bolivian microfinance institutions 
followed a procyclical tendency)  and smaller in recession years. But, following the 
argument of this paper, it would appear that this contribution can be increased if:  
(i) the pattern  of demand shifts in favour of the sectors which are supported by 
microfinance; 
                                                 
21 For derivation see the Appendix (table 9) 
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(ii) the state abstains from actions which are hostile to sustainable microfinance, 
such as debt rescheduling ; 
(iii) the design of microfinance institutions is amended in a manner which will 
assist financial discipline – for example by means of the devices which we 
have examined in this paper, such as savings and (quasi-) insurance. 
 
If we use the estimates presented in tables 5 and 6, we obtain the following extremely 
provisional estimates (table 7) of the possible impact of these modifications in policy 
and institutions: 
 
Table 7. Estimated effects of ‘design changes’ and other 
macroeconomic influences on Bolivian GNP 
 
Change in policy or 
institutional design 
Effect on: 
 Microenterprise sector
investment 
 
($mn and percentage of 
GNP) 
GNP 
($mn and percentageof 
GNP) 
Exogenous shocks 
1% increase in foreign 
investment 
4.0 (0.45%) 8.0(0.1%) 
1% increase in annual demand 
growth rate for wholesale and 
retail trade 
2.1(0.02%) 3.6(0.04%) 
Design changes for the 
microfinance sector 
Increase in voluntary savings of 
$20mn, brought about by 
conversion of 3 NGOs into FFPs 
 
 
 
 
$16mn(0.18%) 
 
 
 
 
$29mn(0.32%) 
Increase in availability of 
insurance, brought about by 
adoption by three NGOs of 
‘internal account’ (or insurance 
modality) 
$2mn(0.02%) $3.6mn(0.04%) 
Decline in microfinance arrears 
rates from 12% to 5% 
$9mn(0.09%) $17mn(0.2%) 
Estimation method: 
For effects on GNP: (∆Y/∆X), where X is an influence which we wish to measure, is equal to ((∆Y/∆Im)( 
/∆Im/∆MC)( ∆MC/∆X) where ∆Im =change in investment by the microenterprise sector and ∆MC = 
change in credit to the microenterprise sector. 
We estimate (∆Y/∆Im) as 1.8 in Bolivia (see Appendix ); estimates of  ∆MC and other variables on 
investment are displayed in table 6, and the determinants of credit creation by the microfinance sector 
(∆MC) are diplayed in table 5. Thus for example, the effect of arrears rates on GNP is estimated as  
(∆Y/∆X), = 1.8 (0.42 (estimated from table 6))(-0.36MC (estimated from table 5 = $17mn(0.2%) in 2001. 
 
Finally we must emphasise that in order to understand the extent to which the 
microfinance sector exhibits pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical behaviour, the fundamental 
relationship is the investment relationship within the microenterprise sector (of which  a 
first estimate is displayed in Table 9 of the appendix). It is clear that whether 
microfinance imparts a procyclical or an anticyclical impulse to the macroeconomy 
depends on whether the ‘accelerator effect’ of the microenterprise sector’s demand on 
its investment, which is procyclical by definition, is or is not cancelled out by the other 
countervailing factors bearing on its investment level. In Bolivia (by contrast, for 
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example, with Indonesia) this counterweight, in its totality, has not been sufficient to 
prevent the total economic activity of the microenterprise sector from falling even more 
than the macroeconomy during the 1997-2003 recession. But, as we have described, 
there is enough institutional inspiration even within Bolivia to give hope that by 
judicious measures of reform these procyclical tendencies can be moderated, there and 
possibly in other countries, in the future. 
            
 
4. Implications and conclusions 
 
                     Very recently, during  2004, evidence has emerged to suggest that Bolivia 
is at last beginning to emerge from the global macroeconomic crisis which, in recent 
years, has been particularly severe in the Southern Cone of Latin America. That the 
microenterprise sector would be damaged by this crisis, as it was in Bolivia, is to be 
expected from the conventional relationship between demand and investment. But the 
existence of counter-examples – not only the case of Indonesia in 1997-2000 brought 
up by Patten et al, but those provided by a large literature on the informal sector which 
suggests that it and the organisations which finance it can provide a shock-absorber in 
time of crisis22 – suggests that it is worth conducting a detailed examination of the forces 
which determine the macroeconomic role of microfinance, rather than expect the 
relationship between demand and investment to be conventional. Such an examination, 
it might be hoped, could help us understand whether there exists the possibility of 
controlling these forces and reducing the damage which they cause for the poorest. This 
has been  the main purpose of the present essay. 
 
    If we begin with the specific comparison with Indonesia, this already 
suggests the importance, not only of design characteristics, but also of demand 
conditions and government policy. Some of the key points of contrast are set out in 
table 8.  The Indonesian macro-economic crisis was more severe than the Bolivian one, 
but it was met with institutions better prepared to withstand a crisis23 . Savings 
institutions, in particular in rural areas, are far better developed in Indonesia.  Grave as 
the Indonesian crisis was, the fall in demand, especially for basic products of local 
manufacture, was less pronounced there than in Bolivia, which gave some 
encouragement to microenterprises and to the financial institutions which service them. 
In Indonesia, by contrast with Bolivia, the state did not intervene to protect distressed 
and disaffected debtors, who therefore had no incentive to seek debt waivers, the more 
so since in Indonesia there is a highly developed system of incentives to repay for 
borrowers and incentives to seek repayment for bank staff (Hulme and Mosley 1996, 
chapter 11)24
                                                 
22 See, for example, Weeks(1975), Mosley(1977). 
23 The Bank Rakyat Indonesia unit desa system in 2000 had 25.1 million savings accounts and 2.6 
million loan accounts, a ratio of 10 to 1 (Patten et al 2001: 1057). By contrast, in the whole of Bolivia, 
amongst those FFPs which are authorised to take savings deposits, the ratio of savers to borrowers is 
more or less one to one, with about 350,000 accounts of each type ( Microfinanzas, (La Paz)12/01, 
tables 2.1 and 7.5) 
24 Many microfinance institutions including the Bank Rakyat Indonesia unit desa system charge 
discounted interest rates to borrowers who have a consistent record of on-time repayment. Many 
Indonesian microfinance institutions including BRI also provide a bonus to staff whose size varies 
according to the repayment record of their clients; in extreme cases such as the KURK system of East 
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Table 8.  The global crisis: two recent country experiences compared 
 
 Bolivia 1998-2003 Indonesia 1997-1999 
Macroeconomic 
development  over period: s
  
GDP growth Fell from 5%             0% Fell from 6%              0.8% 
Investment rate Fell from 23%                   12% Fell from 31%                12% 
Demand (growth of services 
sector) 
Average  0.9% p.a. Average 1% p.a. 
Government actions towards 
the microfinance sector:  
  
Negotiations Rescheduling of various 
microfinance debts, 1999 and 
2001, in reponse to demands by 
‘debtors’ cartels’ 
No rescheduling 
Regulatory actions Licensing of FFP sector 
(nonbanks authorised to take 
deposits),  
 
Structure and behav our of 
the microfinance sector: 
i
 
(averages over period stated) 
  
Growth of lending -0.1%p.a. (1) 14% p.a. (BRI system only) 
Arrears rates2 Average 11% Average 2% 
Ratio of savings accounts/loan 
accounts 
10:1(BRI) 1:1(all microfinance institutions) 
Insurance  facilities Some ‘quasi-insurance’ 
arrangements exist for low-
income borrowers, especially in 
‘village banks’ (ProMujer and 
CRECER) 
Little adaptation of insurance 
institutions for low-income 
clients 
Incentives to repay for clients  None Discounts for on-time repayment 
in BRI and elsewhere 
Incentives to staff Few In a majority of microfinance 
institutions, staff bonuses related 
to loan repayment levels exist 
Sources: Bolivia: Tables 1, 2 and 4 above. Indonesia: microfinance (BRI) data from Patten and 
Rosengard (2002); macroeconomic data from IMF, nternational Finance Statistics, various issues. I
                                                                                                                                           
Note: 11998-2001 
          2Proportion of portfolio more than six months in arrears on 31 December. 
 
 Beyond these comparisons there are also some lessons of a more general 
nature that can be learned from theBolivian experience: (i) a move upmarket by 
microfinance institutions is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
protecting the portfolio; (ii) insurance and ‘quasi-insurance’ institutions (such as the 
internal accounts of the village banks) can encourage investment amongst poorer 
clients, (iii) it is possible to mobilise savings by taking advantage of, rather than 
fighting, prudential restrictions on NGOs (for example, the two NGOs FIE and 
ProMujer are proposing to collaborate in encouraging their clients to save with 
commercial financial organisations). The recent global crisis has exposed, for better 
and for worse, the national significance which microfinance occupies in many 
economies, and we hope that this analysis may have helped to clarify that role. But 
 
Java, some loan collection officers are paid purely out of commission on loan repayments and receive 
no basic salary at all (Hulme and Mosley, chapter 11, p.   ) 
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perhaps the most intriguing lesson of these years of crisis is that, in Bolivia at least, it 
is the institutions whose motives were purely economic and which competed by the 
law of the jungle which lost, and the institutions with broader social motives which 
gained. In a free competition between the lion and the lamb, it is the lions which have 
weakened (and in some cases died) and some of  the lambs  have not only survived 
but registered a greater contribution to the national economy. 
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Appendix  
(i) Analytic formulation of the model 
(instruments of policy or institutional design in bold) 
 
(1) Y = C+I+G+X-M        Standard equilibrium condition 
(2) M = m(Y-T)                Imports 
(3) C = c(Y-T)                  Consumption fiunction 
(4) I = Is + Il                      Investment by large firms and microenterrpises 
(5) Is = f (MC, σs, Y)          Determinants of microenterprise investment 
(6) MC = g (Y, DP, DR, σ, If) Determinants of microcredit growth 
(7) σ = f (s, ins)                    Microcredit clients’ risk perceptions 
 
thus: Y = (Is + Il +G + X + M) (1/1-(c-m)(1-t)) 
 
Notation: 
C= consumption                                                 G = government spnding 
X = exports                                                         M = imports 
MC = volume of microcredit                              DP =demand pattern (growth rate of wholesale 
                                                                                    and retail trade sector) 
DR= microfinance default rate                            σ = risk level as perceived by microenterprise             
                                                                                   sector 
       I = investment                                                     Im = investment by microenterprise sector 
       Il = investment by large firms                              If   =  investment by foreign firms    
      S = availability of savings facilities                      ins  = availability of insurance facilities 
 
 
Important multipliers or ‘impacts’ 
 
Short –term impact of microcredit on GNP: 
 
(1)∂Y/ ∂MC = (1/(1-(c-m)(1-t)), the standard multiplier, >0 if   0<(c-m)<1 
 
Using estimated averages for Bolivia for 1998-2002: c= 0.75, m=0.25, t=0.11, so the 
multiplier  
 1-(c-m)(1-t)) = 1.8 approximately.          
 
Long-term effect of microcredit 
 
(2a) ∂Is/∂Y-1 >0 by definition     (the accelerator principle) 
 
(2b) dIs /dY-1: 
>0 if the standard accelerator  ∂Is/∂Y-1   is of greater value than the combined effect of the 
other terms which influence Is (+ (DP, DR, σ   and indirectly s and ins)  ; in this case, the 
impact of microfinance is procyclical and tends to aggravate crises (declines in Y)  . 
<0  if the standard accelerator is of lesser value than the combined effect of these terms.  
In this case the impact of microfinance is anticyclical and  counterbalances any 
tendency of Y to decline. 
 
In our model the main terms which provide an opportunity for microfinance to act as a 
countercyclical influence  are: 
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DP, the pattern of demand (here represented by the growth of the trade sector); 
DR, the default rate (and policies bearing on this such as government debt amnesties); 
σ, the level of risk attached to investment prospects (and thus availability of savings and 
insurance facilities, which contribute to its determination). 
 
 
(ii) Data 
 
For the Bolivian macro-economy, the data derive from the national accounts; for 
microfinance, the source in a majority of cases is the FINRURAL database, which is 
derived from regular monthly surveys on microfinance institutions in Bolivia and is 
downloadable electronically from www. finrural-bo.org.  However, two important 
variables contained in the analyses of Tables 5 to 7 cannot be downloaded in this way, 
and have had to be constructed for this paper. These are: 
 
I. Investment (by the microenterprise sector) 
This variable is one of the crucial links between microfinance and the macroeconomy. 
It has had to be measured: 
• (i) in the case of BancoSol,PRODEM, ProMujer and SARTAWI) by using a 
linkage coefficient between value of lending and value of fixed capital 
investment based on sample survey data for those institutions for 1999; 
• (ii)in the case of FIE, ANED, Caja los Andes and CRECER), by computing this 
linkage coefficient from a survey of microfinance institutions conducted by 
FINRURAL with Ford Foundation support in 2002; 
• (iii)in the case of ProMujer, by using method (i) up to 1999 and method (ii) 
thereafter; 
• in the case of other institutions, by using a coeffiecient which averages across the 
1999 and the 2002 data. This method of measurement gives the following 
estimated values for 1995-2001: 
 
 
 
Table 9. Bolivia: Estimated investment by the microfinance sector 1995-2002 (in US $)  
 
 
Clients of: 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003* 
BancoSol 5.93 19.23 23.50 17.78 13.36 -7.15 5.37 -0.6 4.4 
ProMujer 0.33 0.83 1.76 -0.18 0 1.75 0.53 1.4 0.4 
PRODEM 3..29 6.32 17.0 10.1 4.09 3.06 17.09 22.0 11.4 
Sartawi 0.12 0.20 0.56 0.31 0.72 0.42 -0.18 0.8 -1.6 
FIE 2.27 2.50 5.79 2.59 5.89 5.22 6.68 14.4 3.4 
C. Los Andes 2.28 7.68 11.55 10.87 9.61 14.49 7.80 24.0 11.8 
ANED 1.64 1.41 1.68 0.85 1.09 0.22 1.26 4.6 0.4 
CRECER 0.33 0.37 0.77 1.03 0.96 0.91 0.65 2.8 3.2 
Others (23) 
plus investment 
not loan-
financed 
5.09 0 9.8 123.1 12.5 -4.2 2.7 9..2 16.2 
Total estimated 
investment, 
microenterprise 
sector 
21.3 38.4 72.4 166.2 48.1 14.7 41.9 78.6 49.6 
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Total estimated 
investment, 
Bolivia 
1022 1199 1554 2004 1552 1534 1141 1148  
Source:  Sample relationship between lending and investment for institutions named above (for 1999, see 
Mosley 2001, table 6; for 2002, see FINRURAL, Impact Evaluation Service, Reports on Institutions 
under Ford Foundation Programme, 2002; available at www.finrural-bo.org. For loan values see 
Microfinanzas, Dec. 2002, table 2.16. Last row is from Muller y Asociados, Estadisticas socio-economicas 
2002, La Paz 2002, p40 
*Estimate..Data for 2003 available up to mid-year only. 
 
These are the estimates used in Tables 5 and 6 above. This measure, however, suffers 
from the obvious faults of sampling error, dependence on sample data for two years 
only, and the making of an arbitrary estimate for investment by non-client enterprises. 
 
II. Measures of risk and vulnerability 
 
 We assume that the investment of the microenterprise sector, like other 
investment, is influenced by its perception of risk, which we have called σ (equation (5) 
above); however, as in other countries, we have no measure of the expectations or risk 
perceptions of the small enterprise sector. What is done in this paper is to hypothesise 
that the perceived risk attached to investment by small business depends on two things: 
(i) the existence or not of an insurance mechanism which can be drawn on in 
case of emergency (compulsory savings and/or a village bank ‘internal 
account’); a score of 1 is awarded for either and 2 for both; 
(ii) the existence or not of voluntary savings deposits which can be drawn on in 
the event of emergency (only the FFPs have these; a score of 1 is awarded 
for a  ‘normal’ level of savings deposits (between 0.5 and 1.5 dollars 
deposited per dollar lent out) and a score of 2 for ‘high’ savings per unit of 
lending (more than 1.5 dollars deposited per dollar lent out). 
 
These two measures give a dummy variable for ‘availability of defences against risk’ 
which may take any value from 0 to 4. Its values over the crisis period, 1997 to 2002, 
are as indicated in table 10 below: 
 
Table 10. Construction of dummy variable: defences against risk 
 
 
Clients 
of: 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
BancoSol 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
ProMujer 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
PRODEM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sartawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIE 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 
C. Los 
Andes 
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
ANED 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CRECER  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
         
 
This ‘defences against risk’ dummy variable is used in the estimation of Table 6 (the 
investment function) above. We expect that investment will be positively related to it; 
rather weakly, it is. 
 31
